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TRADE SECRET PROTECTION: AN ANALYSIS
OF THE CONCEPT "EFFORTS
REASONABLE UNDER THE
CIRCUMSTANCES TO MAINTAIN
SECRECY"
David W. Slabyt
James C. Chapmantt
Gregory P. O'Harattt
I. INTRODUCTION
The success of any business depends on its ability to obtain and
maintain a competitive advantage in the marketplace. Quite often,
a company's competitive advantage is provided by some form of
formula, process, knowledge or product that a competitor does not
possess. Once a company develops such a competitive advantage, it
must take certain steps to ensure its protection. In many circum-
stances, trade secret law provides an effective means of protecting
sensitive information that is at the foundation of a company's com-
petitive advantage.
Unless reasonable efforts are undertaken to maintain the confi-
dential nature of trade secrets, a competitor can legally appropriate
the trade secret and thereby destroy or compromise another's com-
petitive advantage. In light of the prevalence of industrial espio-
nage today,1 the trade secret owner must stand vigilant to protect
Copyright © 1989 James C. Chapman, Gregory P. O'Hara, David W. Slaby. All Rights
Reserved.
t David W. Slaby is a litigation partner in the San Jose Office of Pettit & Martin.
Pettit & Martin is a full service law firm with seven offices throughout the United States and
Hong Kong. The San Jose office handles litigation, government contract and corporate mat-
ters and represents a wide variety of high technology clients.
if James C. Chapman is a corporate associate in the San Jose Office of Pettit &
Martin.
tt Gregory P. O'Hara is a litigation associate in the San Jose Office of Pettit & Martin.
1. See E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1016 (5th Cir.
1970); Greenwald, Corporate Cloak & Dagger, TIME, Aug. 30, 1982, at 62, 63; FBI, DuPont
Foil Extortion Plot, San Jose Mercury News, Feb. 28, 1989, at 5D. In December, 1988, an
individual contacted DuPont offering to sell DuPont documents from the Company's Argen-
tina subsidiary regarding its spandex technology. The individual demanded $10 million for
the documents. If DuPont refused to pay the requested sum, the individual would use the
information to go into business for himself or sell the information to one of DuPont's Coin-
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its competitive advantage against theft or other unlawful
appropriation.
This article will first define and discuss the requirements for
the legal standard of "efforts that are reasonable under the circum-
stances to maintain secrecy." It will then develop a model based on
a cost-benefit analysis to aid companies in constructing or refining
their trade secret protection programs. Finally, this article will
demonstrate, within the constraints established by the requirements
of "efforts reasonable under the circumstances," how any company,
large or small, can develop an effective program using cost-benefit
analysis.
II. TRADE SECRET PROTECTION
A. Policy of Trade Secret Protection
Trade secret protection has been traced back to 1851 in Eng-
land2 and 1868 in the United States.' Over the last 100 years, the
common law of trade secret protection has developed from two fun-
damental policy objectives: (1) the maintenance of standards of
commercial ethics; and (2) the encouragement of research and inno-
vation.4 Trade secret law protects against the misappropriation of
one's investment of time and labor in developing information, prod-
ucts or processes.5 Trade secret law does not protect secrecy as
such, but protects against unlawful means of unveiling the secret.6
Because the law affords no rights to the information if it is volunta-
rily disclosed, the trade secret owner must undertake reasonable ef-
forts to prevent its disclosure.
B. Trade Secret Status at Common Law
Although the prerequisites for trade secret protection at com-
mon law have varied from state to state and from time to time, the
cases indicate that three elements are generally required for trade
petitors. DuPont alerted the FBI and the sting operation was put into action. Police arrested
four people carrying thousands of DuPont documents in Geneva, Switzerland.
2. Morison v. Moat, 68 Eng. Rep. 492, 9 Hare 241 (1851).
3. Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452 (1868).
4. Fleming Sales Co. v. Bailey, 611 F. Supp. 507 (D.C. Ill. 1985); E.I. duPont
deNemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100 (1917); E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v.
Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970). One commentator notes that the sole policy
behind trade secret protection is that allowing a free ride on the intellectual endeavor of
another is unjust. R.A. Klitzke, Trade Secrets Important Quasi-Property Rights, 41 Bus.
LAW. 555, 558 (1986).
5. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d at 1015.
6. Clark v. Bunker, 453 F.2d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir. 1972).
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secret status. The trade secret must (1) be used in one's business,
(2) provide a competitive advantage to its owner, and (3) be secret.7
Secrecy is an illusive and critical requirement for the trade se-
cret owner. In determining whether the secrecy element has been
met by the claimant, courts will look to whether the information
was generally known or available and whether reasonable efforts
were undertaken by the claimant to maintain secrecy.8 It is clear
that the trade secret owner must take some affirmative steps to
maintain secrecy; a plan of taking no special precautions for fear of
arousing undue interest in the information is sure to fail.9
C. Modern Developments in Trade Secret Protection
In 1979, the commissioners on Uniform State Laws adopted
the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), attempting to normalize
trade secret law among the states. 10 The UTSA essentially codifies
the best-reasoned decisions at common law with regard to trade se-
cret protection.11 Case law prior to the adoption of UTSA is in-
structive for determining trade secret status in those states that have
adopted the UTSA, as well as those that have not.12
The UTSA defines a trade secret as:
[I]nformation, including a formula, pattern, compilation, pro-
gram, devise, method, technique, or process, that: (1) Derives
independent economic value, whether actual or potential, from
7. See, eg., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,474 (1974); FMC Corp. v.
Taiwan Tainan Giant Indus. Co., 730 F.2d 61, 63 (2nd Cir. 1984). This tripartite test is
derived from the RESTATEMENT OF ToRs, § 757 comment b. Recently, courts have not
required the trade secret to be actually used in the owner's business. Instead, the focus is on
the actual or potential commercial value of the trade secret and the element of secrecy. See
Syntex Ophthalmics, Inc. v. Tsuetaki, 701 F.2d 677, 683 (7th Cir. 1983); Reinforced Molding
Corp. v. General Electric Co., 592 F. Supp. 1083, 1087 (W.D. Pa. 1984); See CAL Civ. CODE
§ 3426.1 (d) (Deering 1989).
8. Junkunc v. S.J. Advanced Technology & Mfg. Corp., 149 Ill. App. 3d 114, 498
N.E.2d 1179 (1986).
9. J.T. Healy & Son, Inc. v. James A. Murphy & Son, Inc., 357 Mass. 728, 260 N.E.2d
723 (1970).
10. Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 14 U.L.A. 537 (1980). The following states have en-
acted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act: Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Dela-
ware, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia and
Wisconsin.
11. Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890, 898 (Minn. 1983);
American Paper and Packaging Products v. Kirgan, 183 Cal. App. 3d 1318, 228 Cal. Rptr.
713 (1986); Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 14 U.L.A. 537, 538 (1980).
12. To the extent the Uniform Trade Secret Act modifies or clarifies the common law, it
will be followed. Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890, 898
(Minn. 1983).
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not being generally known; and (2) is the subject of efforts that
are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.1
3
The UTSA definition of trade secret reflects the most contem-
porary language developed at common law, omitting the require-
ment that the trade secret be used in one's business.
14
Under the UTSA, as at common law, the two critical factors
for trade secret status are commercial value and secrecy. Once
commercial value and secrecy have been established, the focus of
the inquiry shifts to the defendant's conduct in obtaining the trade
secret. However, for the trade secret owner, the first and foremost
consideration is establishing trade secret status.
A trade secret has commercial value if it derives independent
economic value from being secret, or if substantial time and money
would be required of a competitor to develop the same
information.' s
Because establishing the commercial value of a trade secret is a
relatively simple task, the primary consideration is designing and
implementing a trade secret program that will stand the "reason-
able efforts" test and assure a determination of trade secrets status.
III. EFFORTS THAT ARE REASONABLE UNDER THE
CIRCUMSTANCES TO MAINTAIN SECRECY
From a review of the history and policy of trade secret protec-
tion and the various cases defining reasonable efforts, a model can
be constructed by which a trade secret claimant can design a trade
secret protection program which accounts for the legal require-
ments as well as the situational factors. Efforts that are reasonable
under the circumstances are those actual efforts directed at specific
trade secrets which are rigorous enough to force another to use im-
proper, unethical or illegal means to discover or make use of one's
trade secrets yet which are not necessarily so extensive as to make
discovery impossible. From this general proposition, the trade se-
cret owner must identify the universe of applicable efforts which
13. Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 14 U.L.A. 537, 538 (1980); See CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 3426.1(d) (Deering 1989).
14. See Epstein and Levi, Protecting Trade Secret Information: A Plan for Proactive
Strategy, 43 Bus. LAw. 887, 894 n.55 (1988).
15. See, eg., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(d) (Deering 1989); Electro-Craft Corp. v. Con-
trolled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W. 2d 890, 900 (Minn. 1983). See Religious Technology Center
v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1986), cert denied 107 S. Ct. 1336 (1987), where one
church sued a splinter church, alleging that stolen scriptural materials were trade secrets, the
court held that a trade secret could not be based on spiritual advantage because no commer-
cial advantage was established.
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may be made to protect trade secret status. From this set, the trade
secret owner must select, based on a cost-benefit analysis, which
efforts will be undertaken.
By its very nature, the requirement of reasonable efforts calls
for a factual determination on a case-by-case basis. There is no
bright-line rule to ensure that the secrecy element is met in all
cases.16 A court will scrutinize the claimant's efforts from hind-
sight, deciding from the perspective of today's knowledge and in-
sight whether yesterday's efforts were reasonable.
From a planning perspective, the trade secret owner must con-
sider how a court will view the efforts in hindsight when determin-
ing whether they were reasonable under the circumstances. The
trade secret owner must be aware of situational factors and how
they will figure into a court's analysis. Because situational factors
are constantly changing, a viable trade secret protection program
requires regular evaluation and definition of the owner's secrets, as
well as monitoring changes in the marketplace and in the status of
available information.17
In designing a trade secret protection program, there are essen-
tially two parameters with which to contend. The first parameter is
the legal environment - requirements established by law to obtain
trade secret status. The, second parameter is the circumstances -
situational factors which affect the determination of what is
reasonable.
A. Legal Requirements
To meet the reasonable efforts test, the law requires the trade
secret owner to undertake actual efforts"8 which are rigorous
enough to force another to use improper, unethical or illegal means
to discover the trade secret. 19 Stated another way, the law requires
the claimant to take those steps necessary which substantially pro-
tect confidentiality and reduce the risk of voluntary or inadvertent
disclosure, without requiring the claimant to employ such efforts as
would guarantee continued confidentiality. Whether the steps actu-
16. Jet Spray Cooler, Inc. v. Crampton, 361 Mass. 835, 282 N.E.2d 921 (1972).
17. Future Plastics, Inc. v. Ware Shoals Plastics, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 1376, 1383 (D.S.C.
1972) (quoting J.T. Healy & Son, Inc. v. James A. Murphy & Son, Inc., 260 N.E.2d 723
(1970)) (trade secret owner must exercise constant vigilance).
18. Electro-Craft, Inc. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890, 901 (Minn. 1983).
19. Clark v. Bunker, 453 F.2d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir. 1972); Henry Hope X-Ray Prod-
ucts, Inc. v. Marron Carrel, Inc., 674 F.2d 1336, 1340 (9th Cir. 1982); Anaconda Company v.
Metric Tool & Die Company, 485 F. Supp. 410, 421 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
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ally taken to reach that objective are reasonable depends on the situ-
ational factors.
There are four legal guidelines which a trade secret owner must
consider: (1) the efforts to maintain secrecy need not prevent im-
proper means of discovery; (2) the efforts must be actual; (3) the
trade secret must be treated as secret; and (4) the efforts must be
directed at the trade secrets.
1. Efforts Need Not Prevent Improper Means
Trade secret law does not protect secrecy. On the contrary,
the trade secret claimant is charged with the burden of maintaining
secrecy. The efforts required to maintain secrecy are only those
which are reasonable under the circumstances, not all conceivable
efforts or those which are so extensive as to make discovery impossi-
ble.20 The trade secret owner is not required to "guard against the
unanticipated, the undetectable, or the unpreventable methods of
espionage now available."2
In E.L duPont deNemours & Company v. Christopher,22 the
court noted that the law does not require unreasonable precautions
to prevent another from doing that which he ought not do in the
first place. While reasonable precautions are necessary, "an impen-
etrable fortress is an unreasonable requirement. '2
The trade secret owner is primarily charged with maintaining
secrecy such that there would be difficulty in acquiring the informa-
tion except by use of improper, unethical or illegal means.24 Rea-
sonable efforts are those that leave little opportunity for
misappropriation except by improper conduct.25
20. Surgidev Corporation v. Eye Technology, Inc., 828 F.2d 452, 455 (8th Cir. 1987).
21. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d at 1016 (5th Cir. 1970); See
also Aries Information Systems, Inc. v. Pacific Management Systems, Inc., 366 N.W.2d 366
(Minn. App. 1985).
22. 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970). The defendant was hired by an unknown third party
to take aerial photographs of a new methanol plant while it was under construction. The
photographs revealed the trade secret process which the plaintiff had developed for producing
methanol. The court held that the defendants had improperly appropriated plaintiff's trade
secret, noting that it would be too much to impose on the plaintiff the enormous expense of
erecting a roof over the construction site to "prevent nothing more than a school boy's trick."
Id at 1016.
23. Id. at 1017.
24. Clark v. Bunker, 453 F.2d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir. 1972); Henry Hope X-Ray Prod-
ucts, Inc. v. Marron Carrel, Inc., 674 F.2d 1336, 1340 (9th Cir. 1982).
25. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d at 1016 (5th Cir. 1970).
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2. Efforts Must Be Actual
It is clear that the efforts must be actual, affirmative measures.
Mere intent to maintain secrecy is not enough.2 6 The trade secret
claimant must manifest its intent by making some effort to keep the
information secret.27 The law also requires such efforts to be a con-
tinuing course of conduct, signalling to all concerned that the infor-
mation is secret.28
3. Trade Secret Must be Treated as Secret
An overriding principle in determining whether efforts are rea-
sonable is whether the trade secret claimant treated the information
as confidential. In Capsonic Group, Inc. v. Plas-Met Corporation,z9
an employer brought a suit alleging that employees had improperly
appropriated trade secrets. In ruling for the defendants, the court
found that there was no showing that plaintiff treated its informa-
tion as confidential or restricted.3"
In Electro-Craft Corporation v. Controlled Motion, Inc., the
court noted that a necessary element of trade secret status is proof
of a continuing course of efforts reasonable under the circumstances
to maintain secrecy.31 The court noted that the owner's efforts
must include some combination of physical security measures and
confidentiality procedures.32
a. Security Measures
In finding Electro-Craft's security measures inadequate, the
court noted: the main plant had seven unlocked entrances without
signs restricting access; employees were not required to wear
badges; drawings and plans were discarded rather than destroyed;
and sensitive documents were not kept in a central or locked
location.33
There are many physical security measures which can be em-
ployed to maintain secrecy. Physical security measures include:
26. Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890, 901 (S. Ct. Minn.
1983).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. 361 N.E.2d 41 (l. App. 1977).
30. Id at 44.
31. 332 N.W.2d 890 (Minn. 1983). The plaintiff, a manufacturer of brushless electric
motors, brought an action against a competitor, claiming misappropriation of trade secrets
with respect to the internal operation of the motors.
32. Id. at 902.
33. Id.
1989]
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locks on entrances; buzzer locks on doors to sensitive areas; visitor
screening and the use of badges; exclusion of the general public;
shredding of sensitive documents; disclosing information to employ-
ees on a need-to-know basis; physically separating sensitive work
areas from the rest of the facility; locked files; exclusion of visitors
from vicinity of machines which are proprietary in nature; use of
screens and barriers during tours; and physically locating the plant
in a geographically remote area.
b. Confidentiality Procedures
In finding Electro-Craft's confidentiality procedures inade-
quate, the court noted that the claimant: did not inform its employ-
ees of the secret nature of the information; did not mark as
confidential the drawings, dimensions and parts sent to customers
and vendors; did not restrict employee access to documents; con-
ducted informal tours for vendors and customers without warning
as to the confidential nature of the information; and conducted an
"open house" at which the public was invited to observe manufac-
turing processes.34
i. General Procedures
There are various confidentiality procedures that may be used
to preserve trade secret status, including: disclosure of sensitive in-
formation to employees and outsiders only on a need-to-know basis;
proprietary markings restricting the use and disclosure of the secret;
copyrighting; contract clauses acknowledging the secret to be the
property of the owner; confidentiality agreements; posting notices in
sensitive work areas warning of the confidential nature of the infor-
mation; and obtaining acknowledgments from employees confirm-
ing their understanding that specific trade secrets are confidential
and not to be disclosed or used except in carrying out the tasks of
their employment.
ii. Notice to Employees
One of the most critical means of establishing the secrecy of
information is to put employees on notice of its confidential nature
and restrict access to those employees who need to use it to carry
out their jobs." The employees should be informed of the specific
information which constitutes a trade secret and must be instructed
34. Id. at 902-03.
35. Aries Information Systems, Inc. v. Pacific Management Systems, Inc., 366 N.W.2d
366, 366 (Minn. App. 1985); Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 892
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not to disclose the secret to others. An employee cannot be ex-
pected to keep in confidence that which he does not know is se-
cret.36 No special situational factors come into play here. The
necessity of informing employees of the existence of trade secrets
and restricting access to them is fundamental to any trade secret
protection program.
i Disclosure to Third Parties
it may be necessary for the trade secret owner to disclose a
trade secret to someone outside of his employment. Nonetheless,
the trade secret owner can maintain trade secret status if appropri-
ate steps are taken. In R TE Corporation v. Coatings, Inc.,"' the
claimant disclosed a welding process to a welding company so that
the latter could manufacture a device according to specifications.
Disclosure of the trade secret in this circumstance was necessary for
the claimant to carry on its business. In such a situation, the owner
may disclose the trade secret and maintain protection if it is dis-
closed in confidence and there is a legitimate need to disclose.38
The claimant must make it clear to the other that the information is
a trade secret, that disclosure is in confidence and further disclosure
or use of the secret for other than the purpose for which it was
disclosed is prohibited.39
If outside tours are to be conducted, the trade secret owner
must ensure confidential information is not inadvertently disclosed.
If a tourist is allowed to view a secret process or information, it may
be viewed as an indiscriminate and unnecessary disclosure, indicat-
ing either that the claimant did not intend to keep the information
secret or that the information was not, in fact, secret.
In Anaconda Company v. Metric Tool & Die Co.,' the trade
secret claimant allowed visitors in the plant and conducted tours of
its facilities.41 In spite of the contact by outside persons, the court
found in favor of the trade secret owner since the efforts to maintain
(Minn. 1983); Wilson Certified Foods, Inc. v. Fairbury Food Products, Inc., 370 F. Supp.
1081 (D.C. Neb. 1974).
36. See Dynamics Research Corp. v. Analytic Services Corp., 9 Mass. App. 254, 400
N.E.2d 1274 (1980).
37. 84 Wis. 2d 105, 267 N.W.2d 226 (1978).
38. Id. at 117-18, 267 N.W.2d at 232.
39. Id. at 117-18, 267 N.W.2d at 232.
40. 485 F. Supp. 410 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
41. Id. at 415. See infra notes 80-81, and accompanying text. Anaconda's maintenance
staff erected screens and barriers around the machines when tours were conducted "with the
greatest screening surrounding those machines closest to the tour aisle." 485 F. Supp. at 415.
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secrecy were reasonable to restrict access and to signal the confiden-
tial nature of the information.
The cases demonstrate that, in dealings with third parties, cer-
tain rules must be observed. First, proprietary information should
be disclosed only to those persons necessary for the claimant to
carry on its business. Second, if the information must be disclosed,
notice must be given that the information is a trade secret, is com-
municated in confidence, and is not to be disclosed to others or used
beyond its intended purpose. These steps must be taken whether or
not the third party is a competitor. Failure to do so indicates that
the claimant does not consider the information confidential. If the
claimant is operating in a highly competitive industry (a situational
factor to be considered), plant tours and other marginally necessary
disclosures may have to be restricted or even eliminated.
In Electro-Craft, the trade secret claimant should have in-
formed its employees, in no uncertain terms, exactly what informa-
tion constituted a trade secret.42 Two situational factors, the
prevalence of cross-hiring in the industry and the nature of the
trade secret, were the circumstances that should have been ac-
counted for by Electro-Craft in designing its trade secret protection
program. Because Electro-Craft did not treat the information as
confidential, the employees did not know, and could not infer from
internal procedure, that certain information was confidential.43
Had the employees been given proper notice of confidentiality, the
subsequent appropriation would have violated the confidential rela-
tionship and would have been improper."
4. Efforts Must be Directed at Trade Secrets
In establishing trade secret status, more is required than gen-
eral business security. Reasonable efforts are those directed at spe-
cific information. In Wilson Certified Foods, Inc. v. Fairbury Food
Products, Inc., the claimant's manufacturing plant had a security
system requiring each person entering the plant to be questioned by
a guard, issued a pass and accompanied by a Wilson employee at all
times. Furthermore, the sole entrance to the processing area stood
in front of the foreman's office.46
42. Electro-Craft, 332 N.W.2d at 902-03.
43. The court noted that security measures are one way to signal to employees that
certain information is confidential. Id. at 902, n.15.
44. Aries Information Systems, 366 N.W.2d at 369 (Minn. App. 1985).
45. 370 F. Supp. 1081 (D.C. Neb. 1974).
46. Id. at 1085.
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The Wilson court noted the following in holding that Wilson
had failed to take reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy: sensitive
documents were kept in an unlocked desk with unrestricted access;
a general description of the manufacturing process was distributed
to Wilson's sales brokers; operators were not cautioned that the
process was confidential; and 10 to 12 tours per year were con-
ducted through the production area.47
Although Wilson had a general security system, it failed to di-
rect its efforts at preserving the confidentiality of secret information.
Specifically, Wilson did not undertake efforts which would signal
that certain information was confidential and which were rigorous
enough to force another to use improper, unethical or illegal means
to discover the information.
B. The Circumstances - Situational Factors
While there is an evergrowing list of efforts that can be under-
taken by a trade secret owner, the primary concern is to select and
implement those efforts which are reasonable under the circum-
stances yet not necessarily so extensive (commensurate with ex-
penses) as to make discovery impossible. To make this selection,
the trade secret owner must first define the universe of efforts which
are applicable under the circumstances. The second step is to bal-
ance the costs and benefits of each applicable effort in making the
final selection of applicable efforts for its trade secret protection
program. 8
There are essentially three situational factors to consider in
choosing the applicable efforts to maintain secrecy: (1) the nature
of the trade secret; (2) the nature of the industry (including the
prevalence of industrial espionage); and (3) the nature of the
company.
1. The Nature of the Trade Secret
a. Obviousness
The nature of the trade secret will determine what efforts are
required to maintain trade secret status. Certain trade secrets, such
as a secret formula, are discrete and of obvious value. Other trade
secrets are not so discrete. In Electro-Craft,4 9 the court noted that
the claimed trade secret was of a nonintuitive nature, requiring the
47. Id. at 1085-86.
48. See, note 62 infra and accompanying text.
49. Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890 (Minn. 1983).
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claimant to inform the employees of the confidential nature of the
specific information.5" Presumably, if the claimed trade secret had
been a discrete formula, the value and secrecy of which was obvious
to the employees, the court may have found trade secret status
notwithstanding that the employees were never specifically in-
structed on the confidential nature of the information. 51
b. Value
Similarly, the value of the trade secret to the company will de-
termine, in part, what efforts are reasonable to maintain trade secret
status. If a company derives all or a substantial portion of its reve-
nues from a single trade secret, it is reasonable to expect the com-
pany to undertake more extensive efforts to maintain secrecy than if
the trade secret is responsible for little or marginal revenue. 52 Con-
versely, one cannot reasonably be expected to spend more time and
energy protecting a trade secret than is commensurate with its
value.
2. Nature of the Industry
a. Competitive Industries
The nature of the industry is another situational factor for con-
sideration in selecting applicable measures to protect trade secret
status. In a highly competitive industry, such as the communica-
tions or computer fields, information is at a premium.53 It is rea-
50. Idi at 902.
51. See also Anaconda Company v. Metric Tool & Die Company, 485 F. Supp. 410
(E.D. Pa. 1980). The owner did not specifically inform its employees of the trade secret status
but security measures were enough to signal to the employees the trade secret nature of the
information.
52. See Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 227 U.S.P.Q. 18, 22 (D. Del. 1985).
Coca-Cola's valuable soft drink formula was the subject of extensive efforts. The written
version of the secret formula was kept in a security vault; the vault could only be opened
upon board resolution; only two persons in the company, whose identities were not disclosed,
ever knew the formula; and the two persons were not allowed to fly on the same airplane.
53. The competitive battle between Proctor & Gamble and Wilson Harrell is illustrative
of the value of protecting ones business plans. In the early 1960's, Wilson Harrell purchased
an obscure wholesale cleaning spray liquid called "Formula 409." By 1967, after a nation-
wide retailing effort, Formula 409 had a 5% share of the U.S. market for cleaning products
and a 50% share of the spray cleaning segment. In 1967, Proctor & Gamble began test
marketing a spray cleaner called "Cinch." Wilson Harrell learned of Proctor & Gamble's
plans to introduce the product and discovered that Denver was to be the first test market.
Wilson suddenly withdrew Formula 409 from the Denver market. As a result of this tactic,
Cinch did extraordinarily well in the test market. When Proctor & Gamble began its na-
tional launch of Cinch, Harrell retaliated. He had pumped up Proctor & Gamble's expecta-
tions with his withdrawal of Formula 409 from the Denver market, but the overall strategy
was to make the Proctor & Gamble executives lose confidence in their product. Harrell bun-
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sonable to expect a trade secret owner in a competitive industry to
account for the fact that competitors are constantly lying in wait to
obtain information at little or no cost.
It is quite common for businesses in a competitive industry to
hire employees away from competitors to obtain information.54
Therefore, the trade secret owner must define the trade secret, re-
strict its access on a need-to-know basis, inform employees of the
specific trade secrets, and instruct them that disclosure is prohib-
ited. This precaution will give rise to a duty on behalf of the em-
ployees not to disclose the trade secrets. 55
b. Prevalence of Industrial Espionage
Another consideration is the prevalence of espionage in the
particular industry. While a trade secret claimant will be protected
from espionage which it could not have reasonably anticipated or
prevented, 6 the claimant, in certain industries, may be called upon
to take some measure to thwart industrial espionage in order to pro-
tect its trade secret status. In Electro-Craft, the court held that a
lax security system by itself did not preclude a finding of reasonable
efforts, noting that industrial espionage was not a major problem in
the particular industry. However, if the industry is one in which
industrial espionage is common, a court may very well require the
claimant to undertake security measures which would not otherwise
be required. At the very least, manufacturing processes or other
sensitive information should be blocked from plain view by four
died his 16 ounce size of Formula 409 with the half gallon size and sold them at a low price.
Harrell intended to load up the typical spray cleaner consumer with about six months worth
of the product. He advertised and promoted the bargain heavily. While Proctor & Gamble
was putting much of its huge Cinch investment into a national advertising campaign,
Formula 409 users did not need any more spray cleaner. The only customers left were new
users, and there were not nearly enough of them to justify Proctor & Gamble's expenditures
on Cinch. Within a year, Proctor & Gamble withdrew its new spray cleaning product from
the shelves. It was Harrell's ability to learn of the Proctor & Gamble plans for the introduc-
tion of its new spray cleaning product, that allowed him to develop a strategy to prevent the
product's success. Similarly, if Proctor & Gamble was able to learn about Harrell's strategy,
Proctor & Gamble could have adjusted its expectations and avoided the loss of millions of
dollars. SOLMAN & FRIEDMAN, LiFE AND DEATH ON THE CORPORATE BATTLEFIELD, 24-
27 (1982).
54. See Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890, 902 (Minn.
1983).
55. Aries Information Systems, Inc. v. Pacific Management Systems, Inc., 366 N.W.2d
366, 369 (Minn. App. 1985).
56. Id. See also E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1016
(5th Cir. 1970).
57. 332 N.W.2d at 902.
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walls and a roof.58
3. Nature of the Company
The final situational factor for consideration is the nature of
the company.
a. Size
In Data General Corp. v. Digitial Computer Controls,59 the
court noted that, due to the small size of the company, plant secur-
ity did not need to be as thorough as that of IBM. It stands to
reason that a small company with few employees need not under-
take the extensive security measures that might be necessary for a
large company with many employees. Assuring security for a small
plant with few employees might be accomplished through simple
devices like locking entrances or storing sensitive documents in a
locked desk.
b. Plant Layout
The physical office or plant layout must also be considered in
determining what measures should be undertaken to maintain se-
crecy. If sensitive areas are accessible to employees without a need
to know, an inadvertent disclosure may result. Physical separation
may be necessary to prevent inadvertent disclosure. One successful
trade secret owner physically separated a sensitive department from
the central facility and kept secret documents in locked files to es-
tablish trade secret status.' °
c. Financial Strength
The financial strength of the company may be a relevant con-
sideration in selecting applicable efforts. It will certainly be a rele-
vant business consideration. It may be considered reasonable to
require a financially strong company to implement extensive meas-
ures to maintain secrecy for a valuable trade secret. On the other
hand, a new or financially unstable company may not be required to
risk financial ruin in order to install an intricate security system.
The financial strength of the company will likely be a consideration
secondary to the value and nature of the trade secret and the nature
of the industry because the trade secret owner will likely be com-
58. 431 F.2d at 1016 (5th Cir. 1970).
59. 357 A.2d 105, 111.
60. Surgidev Corporation v. Eye Technology, Inc., 828 F.2d 452, 455 (8th Cir. 1987).
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pelled to undertake certain minimal efforts notwithstanding finan-
cial strength.
C. General Approach
Most trade secret protection programs will include certain
minimum efforts. First, the trade secret owner should consciously
identify the trade secret. Second, the trade secret should be marked
as proprietary, whether it is viewed solely by employees or by
outside parties. If a trade secret is embodied in a form other than a
document, signs should be posted proclaiming its proprietary na-
ture.6' Third, access to the secret information should be restricted
solely to those employees who have a need to know to carry out
their job functions. Fourth, as to those employees to whom the in-
formation is accessible, notice must be given that the information is
proprietary and secret. Furthermore, these employees must be in-
structed not to disclose the information to any other person or to
use the information other than for carrying out their jobs. Fifth, if
proprietary information must be disclosed to third parties (whether
vendors, purchasers or licensees), a confidentiality agreement must
be obtained prior to disclosure. The agreement should specifically
set forth the information that is considered confidential and explic-
itly state that the information is not to be disclosed to any other
party or used for any other purpose other than that for which it was
disclosed. Finally, security measures must be implemented as a sig-
nal to employeee and outsiders that certain information is secret.
While the particular situational circumstances will determine
the extent of security measures undertaken, certain minimum ef-
forts must be made. Doors should be locked and access to sensitive
areas restricted. Sensitive documents should at least be locked in a
desk or cabinet to which access is restricted. Sensitive documents
should not be discarded, but should be destroyed, if only by manual
tearing.
In constructing a trade secret program, in addition to balanc-
ing the legal requirements with the situational factors, the trade se-
cret owner should keep in mind that the overriding principle is to
treat the information as confidential. The owner must put the
world on notice, whether by security measures or confidentiality
procedures, that the information is valuable, secret and not to be
disclosed.
The following section evaluates, on a cost-benefit basis, the
61. For example, a machine.
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business considerations of a trade secret program within the legal
framework of common law decisions and the UTSA. It will ex-
amine the various business considerations (the value of the trade
secret to the company, the costs of protecting the trade secret, and
the risks of losing trade secret status) that must play a part in the
final selection of applicable efforts to maintain trade secrecy.
IV. USING COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS TO CONSTRUCT A VIABLE
TRADE SECRET PROTECTION PROGRAM
Companies that are in the process of developing a trade secret
program and those already employing one can use cost-benefit anal-
ysis to determine the scope and desired effectiveness of their pro-
grams. This decision involves determining the desired protection by
balancing the cost of the program with the goals of achieving ade-
quate protection and minimizing the risks of disclosure.62
The costs expended and benefits obtained lie on a continuum of
risk. At one extreme, there are efforts which courts have deter-
mined to be reasonable and are highly likely to remain so again in
the future. These are comprehensive trade secret protection pro-
grams which include procedures for identifying and defining trade
secrets, isolating or restricting access to them and putting others on
notice that certain information is secret. Depending upon the eco-
nomic value and nature of the trade secret, they require varying
amounts of time, energy and money.
Towards the center of the continuum are efforts which courts
have upheld as reasonable but with less conviction. Although the
risk is greater, it is likely that these types of efforts will also be up-
held as reasonable. The programs are less comprehensive, less ex-
pensive, but are characterized by a greater likelihood of being found
inadequate by a court and thus provide less assurance to the trade
secret owner. These programs include less formal and less clearly
defined procedures for identifying and defining trade secrets, re-
stricting access to them and putting others on notice that certain
identified information is secret.
At the other end of the continuum are efforts which courts
have held to be unreasonable or inadequate. These programs are
modest and entail very high risk. They fail to include procedures in
one or more of the critical areas or have been compromised in one
fashion or another. 63 It is highly likely that the owner of the secret
62. Risk as used herein means the likelihood that the companies efforts to maintain
secrecy will be found inadequate by a court of law.
63. CVD, Inc. v. Raytheon Company, 769 F.2d 842 (Ist Cir. 1985). Raytheon claimed
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information, who employs this type of program, will be denied the
protection of trade secret law and will have no remedy against a
misappropriator.
In order to avoid unnecessary mistakes, companies should pay
close attention to the continuum of risk and use cost-benefit analysis
when forming or evaluating their trade secret programs.
A. Efforts Which Are Reasonable Under the Circumstances
to Maintain Secrecy
As previously discussed, efforts reasonable under the circum-
stances to maintain secrecy are actual efforts directed at specific
trade secrets, rigorous enough to force another to use improper, un-
ethical or illegal means to discover or make use of one's trade
secrets, yet not so extensive as to make discovery impossible. Such
efforts must include, to the extent appropriate relative to the nature
of the trade secret, the nature of the company and the nature of the
industry, identifying and defining one's trade secrets, marking them
as proprietary, isolating or restricting access to them and putting
others on notice that certain information is secret by means of se-
curity measures or confidentiality procedures.
In Valco Cincinnati, Inc. v. N & D Machinery Service, Inc.,"
Valco claimed that information gathered over a twenty-four year
period through its engineering, experimentation and expertise,
which allowed Valco to develop a standard inspection of materials,
processes, dimensions and tolerances of its product was its trade
secret.65 The appellate court affirmed the trial court's holding that
Valco had taken reasonable precautions to safeguard its trade
secrets.66 Valco's plant had more than adequate locking devices; a
receptionist screened every visitor to the building; Valco used a
buzzer lock system on the door to the processing area which was
operated by the receptionist; the general public was never taken
through the plant; competitors were never authorized within the
plant; Valco's drawings were made available to their suppliers only
elements of its chemical vapor deposition process used to manufacture zinc selenide and zinc
sulfide were trade secrets. The court stated that Raytheon's failure to follow its own estab-
lished procedures for the protection of trade secrets was a significant factor in denying Ray-
theon trade secret status for its manufacturing process. Id. at 853.
64. 24 Ohio 3d 91, 492 N.E.2d 814 (Sup. Ct. Ohio 1986). Valco Cincinnati, Inc., a
manufacturer of parts for a commercial glue applicator, brought an action for wrongful ap-
propriation of trade secrets and sought to enjoin N & D Machinery Service, Inc. from manu-
facturing certain replacement parts for Valco's products. Id. at 815.
65. Id. at 816.
66. Id. at 819.
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for the limited purpose of bidding on the manufacture of certain
parts; drawings were made available only to employees with a spe-
cific need for them; all drawings that left the plant were required to
have a proprietary marking restricting their use and disclosure; a
shredder was utilized to destroy all computer printouts and old
drawings; and the company had a policy of obtaining nondisclosure
agreements from its key employees.67
Valco's trade secret protection program was comprehensive.
Its use of numerous locking devices and the screening of each visi-
tor went beyond mere intent to maintain secrecy and provided suffi-
cient, actual security measures. The exclusion of the general public
and competitors from the plant, restrictions on dissemination of
documents to suppliers and employees, proprietary markings on
drawings and use of nondisclosure agreements were efforts directed
at specific trade secrets and were adequate to maintain confidential-
ity. These techniques of restricting access to information and alert-
ing individuals to its confidential nature clearly signaled to
employees and others that certain information was secret and
should not be disclosed. As a result, in making use of Valco's trade
secrets, Valco's former employees engaged in improper conduct -
a breach of their fiduciary duty of confidentiality.
However, this program was costly. The exclusion of the public
from the plant may have prevented Valco from increasing commu-
nity support and the value of its goodwill. Tight restrictions on dis-
semination of information may decrease employee efficiency and
doing business with third parties may become more difficult and
time consuming. As a result, a company using this type of trade
secret protection program may lose business opportunities. In addi-
tion, tight security measures may create an atmosphere of distrust
and employee morale may suffer, resulting in decreased employee
loyalty and productivity.
In Aries Information Systems, Inc. v. Pacific Management Sys-
tems Corporation,6" Aries claimed that information which consti-
tuted its software product was a trade secret.6 9 Because all of the
67. Id.
68. 366 N.W.2d 366 (Ct.App. Minn. 1985). Aries, a developer of financial accounting
software named POBAS III, brought an action against its former employees seeking to re-
cover damages for misappropriation of its trade secret. The former employees which had
access to Aries software materials and present and prospective clients formed a separate com-
pany to compete with Aries. Id. at 366-67.
69. Id. at 368. Aries spent over $100,000 for research and development for POBAS I.
As a result of improvements and additions, POBAS II was developed. After eight or ten
years and substantial capital investment, POBAS II was transformed into POBAS III. Id. at
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source code listings and magnetic tapes incorporating the software
bore proprietary notices, Aries user manuals were copyrighted and
stated that the information was proprietary, every customer con-
tract stated that the software was the exclusive property of Aries,
and its key employees signed confidentiality agreements, the court
held that Aries took reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy.70 The
efforts went beyond intent, were directed at specific trade secrets
and indicated the secrets were confidential.
By employing a program of this nature, Aries obtained signifi-
cant benefits at a relatively low cost. Proprietary notices, copyright
notices and nondisclosure agreements can be employed with mini-
mal cost. These low cost methods should be part of every com-
pany's trade secret protection program.
Because the misappropriation was accomplished by employees
of Aries, the company's physical security measures were not at is-
sue. It was the efforts taken to maintain confidentiality which led
the court to rule in favor of Aries. The court noted that "[i]t is
difficult, if not impossible, to prevent an employee from discovering
his employer's trade secrets."' 71 Although preventing discovery is
difficult, an employer must still seek to limit access to information
and prevent disclosure by employees and others by signaling that
certain information is secret and should not be disclosed. Aries
used proprietary notices to identify its trade secrets and confidenti-
ality agreements to put employees on notice that information was
secret.
The decision in Surgidev Corporation v. Eye Technology, Inc.,7
is illustrative. Surgidev took actual efforts, which were directed at
specific trade secrets which put others on notice that sensitive infor-
mation was secret. Surgidev's security procedures, including sepa-
rating a sensitive department from the central facility and keeping
secret documents in locked files, were held to be reasonable under
the circumstances. 73 By physically separating one department from
the central facility, access to sensitive information was restricted
and the information was protected from discovery by outsiders.
367-68. Without its trade-secret protection program Aries' former employees would had
been able to forego such an investment in time and money and compete directly with Aries.
70. Id. at 368-69.
71. Id. at 369.
72. 828 F.2d 452 (8th Cir. 1987). Surgidev, a manufacturer of intraocular lenses
brought an action against a competitor and former employees for misappropriation of trade
secrets, breach of contract and tortious interference with contractual relations. The district
court's ruling that Surgidev took efforts reasonable under the circumstances to maintain the
secrecy was affirmed. Id at 452.
73. Id. at 455.
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The use of locked files made the information less accessible to out-
siders, providing even more protection. As a result of these security
procedures, it would be very difficult for an outsider to discover
Surgidev's trade secrets.
The overall cost of Surgidev's security procedures is unclear.
The use of locked fie cabinets is an easy, low cost method of secur-
ing documents. If one of the criteria for designing a plant is secur-
ity, then separating a sensitive department or manufacturing area
from the main plant would cost less than obtaining such separation
after the plant is built. The separation, however, may not be cost-
effective to the company's operation.
In addition, Surgidev's efforts to maintain the confidentiality of
its proprietary information were deemed adequate. By requiring
employees to sign non-disclosure agreements and restricting the dis-
tribution of secret materials on a strictly need to know basis,
Surgidev identified its trade secrets and put its employees on notice
of the trade secret status of matters on which they were working.74
An example of distribution on a strict need to know basis is
Surgidev's practice with respect to the dissemination of sales re-
ports. The hierarchial structure of the company was important in
developing the method used. Field sales representatives received
sales data only for their assigned sales territory. 75 Regional sales
managers received sales data only for the regions to which they are
assigned.76 Only certain high level executives were exposed to com-
pany-wide sales figures.77
Although this method of restricted dissemination is effective at
limiting the distribution of sensitive information, it also prevents
employees from using the information for comparison, performance
appraisal and as a motivating tool. It is this type of cost-benefit
analysis, including the analysis of qualitative as well as quantitative
costs and benefits, that a company must undertake to develop a
trade secret protection program which meets its needs relative to
the amount of risk it desires to assume and costs it is willing to
undertake.
In each of these cases, the owners of the trade secrets made a
substantial investment in time, energy and money to protect trade
secrets which were critical to the operation and success of each
74. Id.
75. Surgidev Corporation v. Eye Technology, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 661, 694 (D. Minn.
1986).
76. Id. at 694.
77. Id.
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company. As a result, comprehensive trade secret protection pro-
grams which included actual measures to maintain the security and
confidentiality of the trade secrets which were directed at specific
trade secrets were necessary. In such circumstances, a larger invest-
ment in time, energy and money is not only justified but it is proba-
bly required. In light of the nature of the trade secrets, including
their economic value, a company in a similar situation should make
a substantial effort to protect trade secrets and reduce the risk of
misappropriation.
It is also important to note that former employees of each com-
pany were named as defendants. This indicates that a threat to a
company may come not only from other companies but also it may
come from employees of the trade secret owner. Management must
be aware of the dual threat when constructing a trade secret pro-
gram and the greater the employee turnover in the industry, the
greater the threat of misappropriation by former employees.
B. Efforts Which Are Probably Reasonable Under the
Circumstances But Are Higher Risk
For companies not having a comprehensive trade secret pro-
gram, there are still steps that can be taken to protect sensitive in-
formation which courts may accept as reasonable under the
circumstances.
In Anaconda Company v. Metric Tool & Die Company, the
court held that Anaconda had taken reasonable efforts to protect its
trade secret of a machine for producing telephone cord armor.
Anaconda had a tight security system. It maintained strict rules
with respect to visitors.79 For example, all visitors were required to
be escorted through the facilities and not allowed to be brought
near machines which were deemed proprietary in nature.8" More-
over, screens and barriers were erected around the machines when
tours were conducted, with the greatest screening surrounding
those machines closest to the tour aisle."1 Such security measures
were sufficient to restrict access to the machines and communicate
to outsiders that such machines were secret.
78. 485 F. Supp. 410 (E.D. Pa 1980). A manufacturer of telephone cord armor brought
an action against a competitor alleging misappropriation and wrongful use of its alleged trade
secret, a profile and winding machine which it engineered and built for the purpose of pro-
ducing telephone cord armor. Telephone cord armor is a strip wound metal hose which
protects a telephone cord from wear, tear, abuse and vandalism. Id. at 413.
79. Id. at 422.
80. Id. at 415.
81. Id.
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In addition, Anaconda's confidentiality procedures were ade-
quate. Proprietary information was disclosed on a need to know
basis to its employees.8 2 Furthermore, Anaconda never advertised
or publicized its machine in any manner8 3 and none of the machines
had been publicly exhibited, described in any publication or sold.8"
This type of program was risky because in spite of the great
value of this machine, which was so complex that it permitted Ana-
conda to be the only producer of telephone cord armor,85 the com-
pany did not specifically instruct its employees as to the proprietary
nature of the machine.8 6 Instead, through the use of its security
measures and confidentiality procedures, Anaconda implicitly iden-
tifled what was secret and restricted access to it. Considering the
economic value of this type of machine, a more direct approach in
providing notice to reduce the risk would have been appropriate.
Another example of a reasonable but risky program is found in
K-2 Ski Company v. Head Ski Co., Inc.8 The court held that exhi-
bition of K-2 skis by one of K-2's suppliers at a conference, limited
tours of K-2's plant and generally loose security measures did not
destroy the secrecy of K-2's manufacturing procedure. 8
K-2 skis were displayed at a conference in Washington, D.C.
with the permission of K-2.19 The supplier displayed two models of
K-2 skis. One of which was displayed intact and the other cut
lengthwise displaying the internal construction of the ski.9" Since
there was no evidence of attendance by the defendant or any other
ski manufacturer, the court found that there was no public
disclosure.91
In addition, only limited tours of the K-2 plant were con-
ducted. Personnel from competitor ski manufacturers were not per-
mitted to view the manufacturing operation.9" Finally, the court
82. Id. at 422.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 415.
85. Id. at 414. Over 200 drawings were required to manufacture the machine. Between
70 and 100 separate sets of tooling were held in inventory for making a variety ofmetal hoses.
Competitors were required to design and build their own machines because none had been
offered for sale by equipment manufacturers. See also supra note 52 and accompanying text.
86. Id. at 415.
87. 506 F.2d 471 (1974). Action by manufacturer of skis against its former employee
and competitor for damages and injunctive relief on grounds of unlawful use of plaintiff's
trade secret.
88. Id.
89. Id at 474.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id
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found that, although security at the plant was not tight, this did not
destroy secrecy because the plant was located in a remote area.
93
The actions taken by K-2 put its trade secrets at risk. The case
may have turned out differently if the defendants were able to pres-
ent evidence that personnel from competing manufacturers at-
tended the conference in Washington, D.C. The competitors may
have been able to learn much about the manufacturing process by
looking at the skis on display.9a In addition, K-2 never warned its
supplier and did not post notices that the manufacturing process of
the skis was confidential, and, that any information revealed by ob-
servation of the manufacturing process was confidential.
Lax plant security is dangerous. Even though the plant was in
a remote location and gaining access to the plant was difficult, ac-
cess to secret information must be restricted to the extent that an
individual must use improper, unethical or illegal means to obtain
secret information.
In Fleming Sales Company v. Bailey," Fleming had a general
policy of maintaining the confidentiality of customer lists and virtu-
ally all other business information.96 Each employee received a
copy of a rules and regulations letter specifying that an employee
would be terminated for exposing confidential information.97 Flem-
ing generally restricted dissemination of complete customer lists to
only a few people.98
However, complete customer lists were supplied to Fleming
principals from time to time; the company had no written policy or
clearly articulated procedures for ensuring the confidentiality of
customer lists; lists were not kept under lock and key or marked
confidential; and salesman kept copies of partial lists in their
offices. 99
93. Id.
94. Although a competitor could buy K-2 skis, cut them lengthwise and study the ski,
thereby learning much about the manufacturing process, this would be reverse engineering
and K-2's rights in its trade secrets would be maintained against all but the party that reverse
engineered the skis. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 3426 (Deering 1988). However, if K-2 provided
the skis and a cross sectioned view to a competitor, it would have disclosed its trade secret
and probably lost the protection afforded by trade secret law.
95. 611 F. Supp. 507 (E.D. Ill. 1985). Fleming, a family owned manufacturers' repre-
sentative business, through its OEM Division was engaged in the marketing of component
parts of recreational vehicles to recreational vehicle manufacturers. Fleming alleged that its
former employee misappropriated its trade secrets, which included customer lists, customer
information and sources of supply.
96. Id. at 512.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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The nature of the company allowed it to use less restrictive
measures in protecting secrecy of its customer lists. Since Fleming
was a sales organization, constant dealings with customers by its
employees were the essence of its business.'" Distribution of cus-
tomer list information to principals or customers on occasion may
well have been necessary to Fleming's business. However, as long
as Fleming scrupulously limited distribution of customer list infor-
mation to employees and outsiders whose access was necessary to
Fleming's successful pursuit of its business, it was deemed to have
satisfied the reasonable efforts requirement.' 1
Although the court held in favor of Fleming, such loose re-
strictions on the dissemination of information increases the risk that
such information will fall into the hands of an outsider and trade
secret status will be lost. The lack of clear guidelines and proce-
dures to be followed in storing and restricting access to such infor-
mation is dangerous. It not only implies the company is not serious
about security, but it increases the risk of inadvertent disclosure.
Finally, failure to mark important information may negate the ef-
fect of other confidentiality procedures which put people on notice
that information is secret. Fleming assumed the higher level of risk
in order to reduce the costs of doing business.
The Fleming court's analysis makes it clear that it is not neces-
sary to take all conceivable or even stringent efforts to maintain se-
crecy. However, the less comprehensive the measures taken, the
more likely it is that a court may find that such efforts are not rea-
sonable under the circumstances. This case has important implica-
tions for smaller, financially unstable companies. These companies
may still protect their sensitive information without extraordinary
expense.
C. Efforts Which Are Not Reasonable Under The
Circumstances
As there are measures which are clearly reasonable, and some
that are risky but probably reasonable, there are measures which
will surely fail to pass a court's scrutiny.
In Capsonic Group, Inc. v. Plas-Met Corp., the court held
that Capsonic failed to make reasonable efforts to protect its trade
100. Id.
101. Ia
102. 46 IlI App. 3d 440, 361 N.E.2d 41(1977). A company brought suit to enjoin for-
mer employees from competing with it in the business of designing and engineering molds to
be used to produce metal and plaster parts.
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secrets; namely, it never treated its information as confidential or
restricted.1"3 Since there were no guards at the unrestricted plant,
passes were not required to enter the premises and important engi-
neering drawings were not kept under lock and key,"° Capsonic's
security measures were deemed inadequate.
Likewise, its confidentiality procedures were deficient. People
were taken on tours of the plant and were never told they were
viewing a confidential process; engineering drawings were not
marked confidential; and employees were never told their work was
secret. 105 Capsonic failed to take any of the steps required to
achieve trade secret protection. Its lack of security procedures
failed to restrict access to secret information. Its failure to use pro-
prietary or confidential markings indicated that it had not identified
its trade secrets and therefore did not direct its efforts at specific
sensitive information. Finally, its general lack of security and confi-
dentiality procedures made it impossible to put anyone on notice
that certain information was secret.
The court in Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion,10 6 ac-
knowledged that Electro-Craft took some precautions in screening
its handbook and publications for confidential information and re-
quiring some of its employees to sign confidentiality agreements.
10 7
However, it held that measures taken by Electro-Craft were
inadequate.108
Electro-Craft's security measures did not demonstrate suffi-
cient effort to restrict access to sensitive information and thereby
maintain secrecy.10 9 Not only was security inadequate but the con-
103. 361 N.E.2d at 44.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. 332 N.W.2d 890 (Minn. 1983).
107. Id. at 895. The confidentiality agreements were part of employment agreements
reading in part as follows:
Employee shall not directly or indirectly disclose or use at any time, either
during or subsequent to the said employment, any secret or confidential infor-
mation, knowledge or data of Employer (whether or not obtained, acquired or
developed by Employee) unless he shall first secure the written consent of Em-
ployer. Upon termination of his employment, Employee shall turn over to
Employer all notes, memoranda, notebooks, drawings or other documents
made, compiled by or delivered to him concerning any product, apparatus or
process manufactured, used or developed or investigated by Employer during
the period of his employment; it being agreed that that same and all informa-
tion contained therein are at all times the property of the Employer.
Id. at n.1.
108. Id. at 901-02.
109. Id. at 902. See also supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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fidentiality procedures were fatally lax. 110 Electro-Craft never iden-
tifled what was secret or provided notice to others that certain
information was confidential and not to be disclosed. The failure of
Electro-Craft to implement more security measures and confidenti-
ality procedures indicated that it did not treat its sensitive informa-
tion as secret.
Electro-Craft could have implemented low-cost measures
which would have significantly decreased the risk of disclosure
without substantially increasing the costs of doing business. Issuing
policy statements and warnings with respect to what is secret and
marking documents as confidential are relatively inexpensive
measures.
In Defiance Button Machine Company v. C & C Metal Products
Corp., x Ithe court held that the company's customer lists lost their
character as a trade secret because the company failed to take rea-
sonable steps to protect the lists." 2 Testimony revealed that Defi-
ance did not intend to disclose its customer list and the disks upon
which the customer list was stored were kept in a locked room."
3
However, the information was also left in the memory of a com-
puter sold by Defiance to C & C Metal, from which it could be
retrieved by using a password readily available in source books to
which C & C Metal had access. 14 In failing to segregate the source
books and erase the lists from the computer, Defiance did not take
reasonable efforts to ensure secrecy of the lists.'
Because Defiance failed to provide escorts for C & C Metal
personnel that were on its premises and use any of the computer
security devices for restricting access to the computer and informa-
tion stored therein, its security measures were found inadequate.
Such lax security failed to restrict access to sensitive information or
110. 332 N.W.2d at 902. "Confidentiality was important in this case, for testimony
demonstrated that employees in the servo motor business frequently leave their employers in
order to produce similar or identical devices for new employer." Id. See also supra note 54
and accompanying text.
Ill. 759 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir. 1985).
112. Id. at 1053. In June, 1982, the assets of Defiance, including a computer, tools,
dies, jigs, fixtures, work in progress, raw materials and finished goods, were sold at an auc-
tion. The buyer of the assets was C & C Metal Products Corp. C & C Metal was permitted
to enter the premises of Defiance for the purpose of removing property purchased by C & C
that was still in the custody of Defiance. C & C Metal hired a former Defiance employee to
demonstrate the use of the computer. During a demonstration, the Defiance customer lists,
which was on disks located on the premises, were printed out. Id. at 1057-58.
113. Id at 1063.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1063-64.
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make it such that they would have to use improper means to obtain
the trade secret.
Additionally, its confidentiality procedures were non-existent.
The use of a proprietary notice or confidential marking that would
appear on the computer screen and on any hard copy of the data
may have made the difference in this case. Such notices would have
indicated that Defiance had identified the list as a trade secret and
put C & C Metal on notice that the information was secret and
belonged to Defiance.
This case is important because of the proliferation of com-
puters and the widespread use of data bases. Reasonable efforts to
maintain secrecy in this context include the use of a computer oper-
ating system that prevents users from reading data they are not au-
thorized to access. In addition, each user should be assigned an
access number or personal identification code before access can be
achieved. Such numbers should be periodically changed and when
an employee leaves the company, his or her password should be
suspended or retired to prevent subsequent computer access.
From the above analysis, it is apparent that cost-benefit analy-
sis within a risk continuum framework provides a useful tool for
constructing and modifying trade secret protection programs. Such
analysis allows a company to tailor its trade secret protection pro-
gram to its needs and set the level of expenditures it desires to incur
in light of the amount of risk it desires to assume.
V. CONCLUSION
In order to protect the secrecy of sensitive information, the
owner need not prevent discovery by improper means but must take
actual steps, aimed at protecting specific information, which indi-
cate that such information is secret. In choosing the steps necessary
to meet the above legal requirements from the universe of possible
protective measures, the owner must consider the circumstances -
situational factors. These include the nature of the trade secret, the
nature of the company and the nature of the industry in which the
company operates. This will allow the trade secret owner to narrow
the universe of choices to a group of potential protective measures.
Finally, in constructing a trade secret program, a trade secret
owner must balance the costs and benefits of potential protective
measures in light of the amount of risk the owner desires to assume.
The owner can evaluate his risk preference by using the continuum
of risk framework. By using this framework an owner can employ
more costly measures that are almost certain to protect its trade
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secrets. Alternatively, the owner may employ less expensive meas-
ures which are likely to protect the trade secrets but have a higher
risk of being found inadequate, or the owner can forego protective
measures entirely, thereby saving the cost thereof and can assume a
high risk of appropriation of his trade secrets and a high risk that a
court would deny him trade secret status for his sensitive informa-
tion. Using cost-benefit analysis based upon one's risk preference,
the owner can select from the group of potential protective meas-
ures those that will make up the protection program and tailor the
program to the business needs of the trade secret owner.
